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Extract from statement of TOGO, Shigenori dated 22 and 28 February 1946.

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Between October 23, 1941, and December 8, 1941, there were a number of liaison conferences, at which the following individuals were present: Hideki TOJO, Prime Minister; Shigetaro SHIMADA, Minister of the Navy; Okinobu KAYA, Minister of Finance; Teiichi SUZUKI, Minister of State without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board; Gen SUGIYAMA, Chief of the Army General Staff (deceased); Osami NAGANO, Chief of the Navy General Staff; Naoki HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; Takasumi OKA, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau; Seiichi ITO, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Navy; Sho MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau; and Isao TSUKADA, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army. I attended these conferences along with the above named individuals. All had active part in the conferences. If necessary, other Cabinet members and government officials attended if it involved their particular ministry. I do not recall the names of the others who attended.

During these conferences, the big question was the settlement of the difficulties with the United States. According to a report from Ambassador NOMURA in Washington, D. C., around October 10, 1941, to the effect that he believed that an understanding had been obtained with the United States concerning such questions as the Tripartite Pact and trade involving non-discriminatory treatment in China. So when I became Foreign Minister I discovered that this was not the situation and that no sufficient understanding had been arrived at on these points; so I asked NOMURA for confirmation. NOMURA replied that the reference report in October was inaccurate, which made the situation more difficult. During the beginning of the liaison conferences such men as SUGIYAMA, SUZUKI, SHIMADA, HOSHINO and TOJO were opposed to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China within a specific time limit. However, at my insistence they agreed with me in the establishment of such time limit. Along with the effort to seek a solution of the issues with the United States, consideration was also given to Japan's productive power, finances, etc. for the eventuality of war. After HULL's note of November 26, 1941, was received it appeared that war was unavoidable.

The decision for war came during a liaison conference on or about November 28, 1941. I was present at this conference along with the persons mentioned above. Because of the firm

stand of the United States as outlined in HULI's note, it seemed that there was no alternative other than for Japan to wage war against the United States. Since it involved the honor of Japan, as well as Japan's existence, there was unanimous agreement at this conference on or about November 28 to wage war against the United States. The next day, on or about November 29, 1941, to the best of my recollection the matter was referred to TOJO's Cabinet, at which meeting I was present, and there was no objection.

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二進ニテオホカシクコトヲ
野村ニ問合セタリ。野村ハ十月ノ参事報告ハ不足額ヲ
以テ自回答ラシメ来タリ。コト事ハ多能ク金ニ困難
ナラシメタモノアリヤ。参事會議ノ初メ頃ハ、若ク
然ル。為目、是等良友、金上ハ多ク人々ノ意見、野村
ハ、期間内ニ、自盡、民衆ノ日本、軍費、検査、ハ、
二、反時、金上、金、多ク、金、上、金、上、金、上、
金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、
米國ノ、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、
ミテ、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、
財政、及、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、
一九四一年十一月二十六日、
ハ不可避ニシテ、見、ハ、

開戦、決定ハ一九四一年十一月二十六日、
召テ為サシタリ。参事會議、人々、金、上、
シテオホカシク。ハ、金、上、金、上、
米國、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、
ハ、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、
果、金、上、金、上、金、上、金、上、
2. 十一月二十六日、参事會議、米國、金、上、
満場一致、金、上、金、上、金、上、
十一月二十九日、参事會議、金、上、
東條内閣、金、上、金、上、金、上、
タカ、何、金、上、金、上、金、上、
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